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Resumo
O objetivo central deste trabalho é mostrar a importância que a organização interna das firmas pode ter 
na decisão de localização das empresas e, consequentemente, no processo de fragmentação espacial da 
produção. Na simulação proposta, na medida em que os custos de comunicação diminuem ou as estru-
turas gerenciais se tornam mais flexíveis, as fábricas tendem a se localizar nas cidades médias, enquanto as 
administrações centrais das firmas se aglomeram nas áreas metropolitanas. A introdução da organização 
interna das firmas no modelo, um aspecto não levado em conta pela abordagem proposta por Jones e 
Kierzkowski, permite formalizar evidências empíricas apontadas pela literatura recente. 
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Abstract
The main purpose of the work is to provide a theoretical link between the location decision and the in-
ternal organization of firms. In the simulation presented, (1) communication costs within the firm and (2) 
managerial structures affect both the production fragmentation process and the economic specialization 
of cities. More specifically, as either communication costs diminish or managerial structures become more 
flexible, manufacturing plants tend to move from the big city to medium cities, whereas headquarters and 
business services tend to agglomerate in the metropolitan area. The introduction of the internal organiza-
tion of firms into the model, an aspect that is not modeled by Jones-Kierzkowski’s approach, allows this 
article to formalize some empirical evidences pointed out by the literature. 
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1 Introduction
Herbert Simon (1991) imagines a mythical visitor from Mars who “approaches the 
Earth from space, equipped with a telescope that reveals social structures” (p. 27). 
The firms are shown as solid green areas, market transactions are red lines con-
necting firms, whereas pale blue lines represent the lines of authority connecting 
bosses with subordinates. Simon says that no matter which economy our visitor 
approached, the green areas would be the dominant feature of the landscape. With 
his story, Simon aims to stress the importance of the organization of firms in this 
social structure called a market economy.
However, if our visitor compared the image captured by his telescope with the one 
taken by the first expedition 30 years earlier, he would be able to see interesting 
differences between both pictures. In the recent image, not only are there more 
red lines – some extremely long – that would show him the increase in the trade of 
inputs, but also many blue lines now connect discontinuous green areas as indirect 
consequences of the increasing intra-firm trade. This structural transformation has 
generated significant impacts on the global economy with effects at different scales, 
national, regional, and urban, since the growing efficiency in transportation and 
communication has given firms more flexibility to make their location decisions. 
This phenomenon has been identified by many works such as Hewings et al. (1998) 
and, more recently, Guo et al. (2005). In both papers, the authors use Chicago data 
and obtain similar results to those found by Okazaki (1989) for the Japanese eco-
nomy: the manufacturing sectors of big cities have become less and less dependent 
on local suppliers and demanders for physical goods, thereby increasing the inter-
regional trade in inputs, whereas they have become more dependent on services 
produced within the metropolitan areas. This process, that has lowered the volume 
of input trade within a region, has been termed “hollowing out.” 
The “fragmentation” of the production process, in contrast, has been studied 
by Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 2003, 2005) among others. 
According to Jones (2000), “production processes that have traditionally been ver-
tically connected, so that all activity takes place in one location, are now frequently 
broken up or fragmented so that regions that are especially well suited to the pro-
duction of parts of the process can now be utilized in producing these fragments” 
(p. 115). 
To explain this production fragmentation, the authors propose an alternative fra-
mework where the service sectors play a crucial role, specifically, “increasing re-
turns are assumed to reside in service link activities (including transportation) 
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instead of on the factory floor (within production blocks)” (p. 5). They call it an 
alternative framework in order to provide a benchmark comparison with the one 
proposed by Krugman (1991) among others in the construction of the ideas known 
today as the new trade theory based on existence of increasing returns in manufac-
turing sectors, monopolistic competition, and love for variety. 
In the Jones and Kierzkowski framework, the process happens especially among 
countries in which each economy produces only part of the final good thus increa-
sing the international trade of inputs. However, as mentioned above, the hollowing 
out process, which has been shown to be strongly connected to the fragmentation 
of production, has been identified at the regional scale (HEWINGS et al., 1998; 
OKAZAKI, 1989). The same tack has been taken by Krugman’s ideas over the last 
twenty years: the new trade theory when applied to regional issues has offered insi-
ghts on the importance of the spatial dimension in economic theory (KRUGMAN, 
1991).
Two recent studies by Duranton and Puga (2002, 2005) not only help us to unders-
tand the relationship between features of the economic sectors and agglomeration 
process but also explicitly mention the connection between the organization of 
firms and the urban structure. The authors offer an insightful explanation for the 
fact that some urban areas have become functionally specialized instead of having 
their activities concentrated on a small number of sectors. This transition, they say, 
“is inextricably interrelated with changes in firm’s organization” (p. 1). 
There is no doubt that the “external-to-the-firm” reasons, such as the cost of fac-
tors and transport, are very important for firms’ decisions. However, the relevance 
of the “external-to-the-firm” reasons does not mean that we should disregard the 
implications of spatially fragmenting the production on the transactions within the 
firms (across establishments). Spatial fragmentation is not only a matter of trans-
port costs, but also it has to do with the control over production. Thus, models 
that can provide us with analyses about the internal organization of firms should be 
taken as complementary tools to examine the regional fragmentation of production 
and the hollowing out process. 
The main argument of the present work is that the questions related to the frag-
mentation and hollowing out processes do have much to do with the transactions 
within them. Considering the production process as a sequence of stages, whene-
ver stages n and n+1 are located far away from each other, we have higher cost of 
transportation and communication. While traders will pay more for transporting, 
they have an alternative strategy to avoid increasing communication costs: the n+1 
stage can lower the level of control that it has over n-stage production. Therefore, 
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how important communication is for a given production process and how commu-
nication flow goes through the different levels of a firm are questions that should 
be answered in order to fully understand firms’ location decisions. 
More specifically, the main objective of this paper is to construct a model based 
on Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Silva and Hewings (2007) to show that commu-
nication costs and managerial structure affect both the production fragmentation 
process and the economic specialization of cities. More specifically, as communica-
tion costs diminish (or managerial structure becomes more flexible) manufacturing 
plants move from the big city to medium cities, whereas headquarters and business 
services tend to agglomerate in the metropolitan area.
2 Model and Simulation
In Aghion and Tirole (1997), subordinate and superior interact to choose the best 
project among some possibilities. Differently, in the present paper, they have to 
make a decision related to the manufacturing plant’s operation. Then, superior and 
subordinate carry out some effort to learn about the problem that demands such 
decision. The probability of understanding everything regarding the problem is a 
function of the amount of effort, which varies between zero and one. Still the ow-
ner may or may not delegate the final decision to the controller and the implications 
of that will be better understood soon. 
A crucial point of the model presented here is that it is based on the incomplete 
contracting theory, which means that the owner cannot contract the subordinate s´ 
effort neither she has a menu of incentive to offer to the subordinate. The owner 
does not know what kind of problem they may face and has no idea about possible 
solutions that can come up from their learning processes. 
In order to enable the simulation to identify the effects of both managerial structu-
res and communication costs on the production fragmentation process, geographic 
aspects and communication costs within the firm are introduced into the original 
model. Besides the delegation scheme and the level of effort, the owner decides 
the location of the manufacturing plant and the headquarters (HQ). The choice of 
placing the manufacturing plant far away from the owner may bring advantages and 
disadvantages to the firm. The only sure advantage of having the manufacturing 
plant close to the owner has to do with the efficiency of communication between 
the owner that lives in the HQ and the controller that is located in the manufactu-
ring plant. Therefore, in other words, the disadvantage of placing the plant far from 
the owner is that communication is less efficient or one could consider this to imply 
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that the cost of implementing an efficient communication system is higher. The 
question, then, could be why should the manufacturing plant be located far away 
if this does not seem to be desirable for the owner? Some reasons can be advanced 
to explain why firms implement the multi-locational system such as factor prices, 
markets and the presence of business services. As a consequence of those reasons, 
manufacturing plants and headquarters may have the highest locational advantage 
in different places what gives the owner incentives to spatially split the production 
process. 
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Figure 1 – The Process of Decision
The decision process is represented in Figure 1. In the first period, the principal 
decides both who will have the formal authority and the locations of its establish-
ments (in the figure, “single” means that headquarters and manufacturing plants are 
located at the same place). After that, each one decides her own level of effort to 
be made in order to learn about the projects and, then, by assumption, they learn 
either everything or nothing. Next, the individual who has the formal authority 
plays in the third period. Assume that the owner delegated the formal authority 
to the controller (in Figure 1). Then, after the learning process, the controller can 
make the final the decision. He will not make any decision only if he does not learn 
anything in the period two. In this case, the controller gives the owner the real au-
thority, i.e., the right to make the decision. Thus, in the last period, the owner will 
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not propose any solution for the problem only if he or she has not learnt anything 
in period 2. In this case, the outcome will be zero for both players. Otherwise, the 
controller will rubber-stamp the owner’s decision.
The agent decides the effort based only on the formal authority arrangement, not 
considering the effort expended by the principal. The assumption behind this sim-
plification is that the controller does not know how much effort the owner is 
carrying out. Thus, even though there will not be a maximization problem for the 
controller, his or her effort responds to the formal authority scheme defined.1 
Note that the owner is seen as a receptor of information coming from the manufac-
turing plant. The owner learns from that information and any problem of efficiency 
of communication will hurt her understanding. The controller does not need any 
communication to learn about and evaluate the projects since the project is rela-
ted to the manufacturing plant controlled by him in loco. Therefore, even when 
the controller and the owner are far from each other, the controller does not have 
any additional cost to learn about the project because the source of information is 
always close to him.2 
Equations (1) and (2) represent the utility function of the owner of firm j, when 
the manufacturing plant locates in city mp and the headquarters is in city mh. In 
equation 2, the formal authority is delegated to the controller. From the compari-
son between both, the owner decides if she will delegate the formal authority. The 
owner decides locations for the manufacturing plant and the headquarters. 
Depending on owner’s decision about the formal authority, her utility function can 
be represented as follows:
 , , , , ,(1 ) ln(1 )
j j j j j
mp mh mp mh mp mh n mp mh mp mhu E B E e B tE w= + − a +σ − +  (1)
 , , , ,(1 ) ln(1 )
j j j j
mp mh d mp mh d mp mh mp mhu e E B e B tE w= − + a +σ − +   (2) 
1 About the effort of the agent, Aghion and Tirole say: “Delegation thus increases the agent’s initia-
tive; because the principal cannot overrule the agent, the agent has more incentives to become 
informed” (p.12). This interpretation is incorporated in the present model. The fact that effort 
of the controller (e) is not a function of the effort of the owner (E) can be understood as if the 
agent had an expectation about the effort of the owner under those two delegation schemes. 
Thus, the expectation of the owner’s effort would be incorporated in the controller’s maximiza-
tion problem, instead of its actual value. 
2 Although the owner needs information that comes from the manufacturing plant, there is no 
correlation between the learning processes of the owner and the controller. We can justify this 
fact by assuming that, first, both need objective information to learn but they interpret it by 
themselves, separately. Second, the owner can communicate to any worker and, thus, the control-
ler cannot limit the owner’s knowledge. 
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E and e represent the principal and agent’s efforts, respectively. The payoff of the prin-
cipal is B when the best project is chosen according to her preferences and a B when 
the agent chooses the project. The third term of the right side ( ,ln(1 )
j
mp mhtEσ − ) mea-
sures the cost of effort made to understand the project. The marginal cost is zero 
when effort is zero and it is infinite when the effort is one. t is equal or greater than 
one and measures the communication inefficiency.  
Note that in equation (1), EB is the probability of identifying the best project ti-
mes the payoff that this project yields to the principal. The effect of delegation on 
the principal’s payoff can be seen in equation (2). (1-e) precedes EB; which means 
that the choice of the principal will be undertaken only if the agent does not learn 
anything. Otherwise, the agent will learn everything and choose the project, which 
is represented by the second term of the equation (2). 
Finally, there is some divergence between the interests of the principal and the 
agent. If the principal chooses the project, her payoff is B, but when the agent 
makes the final decision, the principal’s expected payoff will be a fraction of B. 
If the manufacturing plant is located far from the owner, part of the effort under-
taken by the owner is lost in the process and, then, t is greater than one. Otherwise, 
t is equal to one and there is no loss of efficiency. 
The locational advantage (w) is determined by three elements: (1) the amount of 
business services present in the city, (2) the population size,3 and (3) the remaining 
exogenous terms (proximity to inputs, wage differential, etc). 
Thus, w turns to be: 
 ,
j j jw p hk m k m= +  (3)
Where:
 1
j j
k k kp X Pop= +δ   (4) 
 1 2
j
m m mh Pop S= δ +δ   (5)
3  Proxy for final demand and other types of services. 
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Therefore jpk is the locational advantage of placing the manufacturing plant of firm 
j in city k and jhm is the gain of locating the headquarters of firm j in city m.
Xk and Popk represent respectively the exogenous locational advantage for firm j 
and the population in city k, whereas Sm is the amount of business sector of city m. 
Therefore, population affects both h and p. A large population could mean a po-
tential market for production, reducing the cost of transportation to ship the final 
good from the manufacturing plant to the consumers. In case of the headquarters, 
the large populations of metropolitan areas would be desirable in terms of supplying 
skilled workers. 
Finally:
 1 2m m mPop NH NP= θ +θ    (6)
 3m mS NH= θ    (7)
NHm and NPm are respectively the number of headquarters and manufacturing plants 
in city m.
Note that the communication costs affect only the efficiency of communication 
within the firm. Therefore, the effect of communication costs on the relationship 
between manufacturing and business services is not considered. However, this sim-
plification should not be seen as a serious limitation since the main objective here 
is to show how and why (1) communication costs within firms and (2) their mana-
gerial structures can change the production distribution over the region. 
In the simulation, the number of cities and firms was arbitrarily defined as, 20 and 
100, respectively. The only purpose of this choice was to make the simulation able 
to reveal what the model claims. The distance between any two cities is the same. 
Besides, in the first period, they have the same population size (normalized at zero) 
and no firms. Therefore, none of the cities has business services in period zero 
(see equation 7). Thus, for the first firm, the only variable that can make the total 
locational advantages (w) vary across cities is X. Then, at the beginning of the first 
period, the first firm appears. It analyzes the cities and chooses a location for the 
headquarters and also a place for the manufacturing plant. For the manufacturing 
plant, it will choose city k such that:
 
1 1
k gX X≥  for all 100g ≤ .
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In fact, for each firm, X will be positive in just one city and zero in any other loca-
tion. The locational advantage is homogenously distributed across cities, i.e., given 
that there are 100 firms and 20 cities, each city will present positive locational 
advantage for 5 firms. 
Since there is no business service in this economy yet and the populations across 
cities are the same, the headquarters of firm 1 will be located in the city where 
the plant is located (city k) in order to avoid unnecessary costs of communications. 
Given this choice, before the second period starts, the simulation updates the po-
pulation and the amount of services in city k. The size of population increases and 
the business service sector becomes positive. Now, the economy is ready to receive 
the second firm. 
Suppose that city v is close to the input of firm 2 and, consequently, it has the 
highest value of X2. 
 
2 2X Xv k>  for any k v≠
Therefore 2kp <
2
vp and firm 2 will have 3 alternatives: (1) locate manufacturing 
plant in city v and HQ in city k; (2) locate everything in city k; and (3) locate 
everything in city v. The last two options have no communication costs. If the ow-
ner is allowed to delegate the decision to the controller, she will have six options: 
the same three location choices under delegation and no-delegation.
After the decision of the second firm, new updating occurs and the third firm 
appears. The important point is that the complexity of the decision-making does 
not increase as the number of firm increases. Firm j identifies the better places 
both for the manufacturing plant and for the HQ. Then, regardless of the number 
of firms already placed, firm j has no more than three options to be evaluated as 
was also the case for the second firm: agglomerating everything (no communication 
costs) where the manufacturing plant benefits most; agglomerating everything (no 
communication costs) where the HQ benefits most; or splitting the firm to take 
the locational advantages in both places. 
To achieve the equilibrium, the simulation should not stop in the last firm’s decision 
of the first round. Instead, the process would stop when the economy converged 
to an equilibrium, i.e., when the decisions made in round z were the same as those 
made in round z+1. If it is assumed that the sequence of entries is the one actually 
observed, some fixed costs have to be imposed from the second round on (see 
PEllENBARG et al., 2002). Assuming that the cost of migration is large enough, 
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equilibrium turns out to be determined in the first round, as will be the case here. 
This assumption can be justified by two arguments: firstly, migration costs are 
actually significant and, secondly, the main purpose of this work is to show that 
different managerial structures and communication costs generate different levels 
of agglomeration (or fragmentation). The analysis is comparative and the absolute 
values do not mean much. 
Initially, all the cities are of the same size. The population of a given city is a 
function of the number of manufacturing plant and headquarters (HQ), whereas 
the amount of business services is a function only of the number of HQ located 
in there. Therefore, there is no maximization problem for service sectors and the 
only agent that makes decisions (location and delegation) is the manager of the 
manufacturing corporation. 
At each period of time a new firm arrives. Hence the increase in the number of 
firms is what drives the simulation. At the beginning of a given period, firm j 
decides the location of the headquarters and the manufacturing plant, taking into 
consideration the locational advantages and the cost of communication in case the 
corporation is split in two different cities. Given this decision, population increases 
where the manufacturing plant and the HQs are located; whereas the amount of 
business services only rises where the HQs are placed.
Before analyzing the results, it is important to highlight the differences between 
what has been proposed here and the analysis presented by Jones and Kierzkowski 
about the production fragmentation process: while they consider service links (ma-
nagement, communication costs, and transportation costs) as key activities that 
present increasing returns to scale, here the model is designed to focus the analysis 
only on management and communication costs within the firm. However, they 
do not model the organization of firms and hence neither the effects of different 
managerial structures nor the interaction between communication costs and mana-
gement can be examined by their framework. Jones and Kierzkowski (2005) point 
out that “such a geographic separation of production fragments introduces the ne-
cessity of establishing service links in the form of transportation, communication, 
and other coordinating activities” (p. 5). In their framework, firms face the trade-
-off between (1) fragmenting the production to exploit a location advantage (which 
decreases its marginal costs) and, doing so, they have to pay the costs of service 
links to coordinate the production now geographically dispersed and (2) producing 
everything in one location without additional costs in terms of service links, but 
with higher marginal production costs. As mentioned, the crucial assumption in 
their work is that the service links present increasing returns to scale. As a result, 
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there is a tendency for fragmenting the process as the production increases once 
the costs of service links becomes less significant. 
The model presented here does not aim to explain all the causes of this phenome-
non, rather it presents a framework modeling the internal organization of firms, an 
aspect that has been overlooked by the literature on fragmentation, so that it can 
add some additional dimensions (management and communication costs) to the 
debate that have been ignored by the literature. 
The Jones-Kierzkowski’s framework allows them to identify the fragmentation pro-
cess by examining a single firm, i.e., the number of production blocks (placed in 
different location) utilized by the firm indicates the degree of fragmented of the 
production process. In contrast, in the present model, many firms can use only 
either one or two production blocks, once introducing multi-establishment firms 
would make the model much less treatable. Thus, the intensity of the production 
fragmentation is measured by the number of firms that split their production in 
two blocks. Despite the limitation of not allowing firms to split the production in 
many blocks, the advantage of what has been proposed here is that, as mentioned 
before, this framework can incorporate management aspects and communication 
costs into the urban system analysis.
3 Procedures and Results
The simulation deals with two scenarios: initially, the owner is allowed to delegate 
the formal authority to the controller, whereas, in the second part, the owner does 
not have this alternative. Besides, as explained in detail below, different levels of 
communication cost are used to check its impact on the regional economy. 
It is worth emphasizing that the objective is to show how and why both the internal 
structure of the firm and communication costs can affect the distribution of pro-
duction over a given region. The parameters used do not come from estimations; 
their role is to introduce into the simulation the assumptions made in the model 
construction. The results coming from the simulations do not aim to measure any 
effect; rather they strongly suggest a tendency for fragmentation when communi-
cation costs are lower and/or the managerial structure is more flexible. Thus, the 
choice of parameters had to satisfy the following condition: they should be neither 
too big nor too low. This condition assures that firms’ decisions will not be defined 
by the initial parameters regardless of anything else.4 For example, if the parameter 
4  
1 2 1 2 30,5; 4; 0,8; 0,3; 0,7; 0,75; 0,4; 2,2; 0,02; 0.08; 0.08n dB X e eσ = = = = = a = δ = δ = θ = θ = θ = .
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that measures the exogenous locational advantages (Xs) were too big the location 
of all manufacturing plants would be the same for any managerial structure and 
communication costs. Therefore, the choice of parameters have to guarantee that 
different communication costs and managerial structures lead (at least one) firms 
to different strategies. 
Recall that at time zero, the population and the amount of business services of all 
(twenty) cities are normalized in zero. Before the first firm comes, the simulation 
randomly defines the order of entries of the firms. Each firm (owner) decides four 
things: (1) the delegation scheme; (2) the location of the manufacturing plant; (3) 
the location of headquarters; and (4) the level of effort to learn about the project. 
In the first round, the cost of communication for firms having manufacturing plant 
and HQ in different locations is equal to one. It means that, in the first round, 
firms do not face additional communication costs when they decide to split their 
production. Then, the first result is obtained. 
After that, the simulation goes to the second round: with the same order of enters, 
all firms make their decisions facing a higher communication cost. In the second 
round, it will be 1.1; in the third, it raises to 1.2, and so on. The communication 
costs vary between 1 and 2 in eleven rounds. Thus, it provides eleven results for 
eleven distinct cases.
The procedure described in the last two paragraphs is repeated 60 times, defining 
at random new orders of enters for each set of eleven rounds (60 orders of enters). 
Thus, for each level of communication cost, the simulation provides a sample of 60 
maps of production as final result. Therefore, this first part allows us to analyze 
the effect of different communication costs for the distribution of production and 
to check whether or not it affects the process of production fragmentation. 
The second part of the simulation follows the same idea using those 60 orders of 
entries defined in the first part. The only difference is regarding the possibility of 
delegating the formal authority to the controller present in the first scenario: in 
the second part, the owner cannot delegate the final decision (this decision struc-
ture will be called “inflexible management”). Thus, the outcome of the second can 
be compared with what was obtained in the first part when firms had “flexible 
management.” 
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Table 1 –  Concentration (%) of Headquarters (HQ) and Manufacturing Plants (MP) 
in the Metropolitan Area5
  Communication Costs 1 1.1 1.5 1.9 2
Flexible Management Concentration of HQ 100 95.3 85.5 85.5 85.5
Standard deviation 0 2.6 6.3 6.3 6.3
Flexible Management Concentration of MP 10.3 35.6 50.3 58.3 58.3
Standard deviation 3.2 5.2 9.0 8.6 8.6
Inflexible Management Concentration of HQ 100 95.3 67.3 67.3 67.3
Standard deviation 0 2.6 15.8 15.8 15.8
Inflexible Management Concentration of MP 20.6 40.6 67.3 67.3 67.3
  Standard deviation  4.1 5.7 15.8 15.8 15.8
Table 1 shows the results for those two managerial structures and five levels of 
communication costs. The numbers represent the average (of those sixty simu-
lations) of the concentration (%) of HQ and manufacturing plants in the biggest 
city of the region. Note that, differently from the so-called Core-Periphery model, 
which assume the existence of a big city surrounded by the periphery, in the pre-
sent work the big city emerges from the model and the location where it will grow 
depends on the order of enters. 
The first results to which attention should be drawn are the different tendencies 
presented by HQs and manufacturing plants. Under both managerial structures, 
as the communication costs reduce, HQs concentrate in the main city of the region, 
whereas the manufacturing plants move to medium cities. Therefore, when commu-
nication costs are low, the large city becomes (functionally) specialized in services. 
In contrast, the manufacturing plants that in the beginning are more concentrated 
in the metropolitan area, – are distributed across cities according to their own lo-
cational advantage. As consequence, one should expect that trade of manufactured 
good within the metropolitan area is more intense when communication costs are 
high. 
The comparison between two scenarios, with flexible and inflexible management, 
shows the importance of the internal structure of firms for the map of production. 
The most important point is the fact that the percentage of manufacturing plants 
agglomerated in the large city is lower when firms have flexible management for 
any communication costs. The opposite happens when headquarters are analyzed. 
5 The same procedure was repeated to run new simulations. Differences between the results shown 
here and the results of those simulations were never greater than 5%. 
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Therefore, the possibility of delegating the formal authority to the controller con-
siderably increases both the fragmentation of production and the functional spe-
cialization of the metropolitan area (services). 
When the owner cannot delegate the formal authority to the controller and com-
munication costs are high, the owner keeps the manufacturing plant and the HQ 
in the same city as can be seen in the three last columns.
In Figures 2 and 3 , the complete sequence of the averages of the concentration of 
HQ and manufacturing plants can be seen for different communication costs.
Essentially, the figures confirm what was seen in Table 1. Nonetheless, note that, 
in the case the delegation is allowed, the concentration of manufacturing plant in-
creases as communication costs go from 1.3 to 1.2, in contrast to the tendency (see 
in Figure 2). This happens because the concentration of headquarters (Figure 3) 
jumps when communication costs become 1.2, which attracts some manufacturing 
plants to the metropolitan area. 
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Figure 2 –  Concentration (%) of Manufacturing Plant in the Metropolitan Area for 
Different Communication Costs 
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While the numbers and graphs presented above strongly suggest that both low 
communication costs and managerial flexibility contribute to the processes of pro-
duction fragmentation and functional specialization of the metropolitan areas, the 
next step is to test if the averages found for the scenarios analyzed are statistically 
different. Since the averages of concentration of headquarters and manufacturing 
plants come from a simple of sixty simulations (greater than thirty), the following 
formula can be used: 
 
1 2
2 2
1 2
1 2
( )X Xz
S S
n n
−
=
+
  (8)
The results are summarized in Table 2 and 3. 
First, Table 2 analyzes the effects of communication costs. It compares the average 
concentrations of establishments for different costs of communication (under flexi-
ble management). For instance, the number in the Northwest cell (12.49) compares 
the concentration of HQs for communication costs 1.1 and 1.5. In contrast, Table 
3 compares the average concentrations of establishments for different managerial 
structures given the communication cost. 
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Table 2 –  Testing the Impact of Communication Costs on the Concentration of HQ 
and MP
Communication Costs 1.1 - 1.5 1.5 - 1.9
Head quarters 12.49 0.00
Manufacturing Plants 8.21 3.07
Table 3 –  Testing the Impact of Different Managerial Structures on the Concentration 
of HQ and MP 
Communication Costs 1.1 1.5 1.9
Head quarters 0.00 3.78 3.78
Manufacturing Plants 5.06 3.08 1.67
Whenever the values in Tables 2 and 3 are greater than 1.65, the averages analyzed 
can be considered statistically different (with 5% of significance).  The concen-
tration of manufacturing plants (Table 2, row 2) presents significant changes for 
different communication costs, which shows the importance of low internal com-
munication costs for firms to decide spreading their production. Still in Table 2, 
it can be verified that the concentration of headquarters does not change for high 
communication costs. However, the concentrations of HQs are very different for 
low costs. In Table 3, except for the case of the concentration of HQs for very low 
communication costs, the results confirm that different managerial structures drive 
the regional economy to distinct maps of production. 
4 Conclusions
The general conclusion of this paper is not very intuitive at first sight: the rapid 
development of communication tools, such as the internet, that has occurred in the 
last decades has provided firms with new alternatives to benefit from their location 
decisions. When managers can coordinate the production from anywhere, and firms 
are not seen as maximizing black-boxes, what happens is that firms can take advan-
tages by placing each establishment and department where they benefit most from 
immobile resources and markets. Moreover, the strategy of fragmenting the pro-
duction is often worth it as long as the decision is delegated to the subordinate. 
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The intuition explaining the main result goes in the following way: in order to bene-
fit from both (1) agglomeration of business services in the metropolitan area and (2) 
the locational advantage, most firms have to fragment their product. However, frag-
menting the product means positive communication costs. Then, once controlling 
the production process turns to be costly, owners will have incentive to decrease 
their effort and, consequently, delegate the final decision to their subordinates. 
Therefore, higher communication costs make the fragmentation process less likely, 
whereas flexible managerial structures allows owners to delegate power, which ten-
ds to reduce the cost coming from the geographic distance between headquarters 
and manufacturing plant, making the fragmentation process more likely. 
This model also confirms the findings coming from empirical work such as Arita 
and McCann (2002) and Sheard (1983) about the positive relationship between 
decentralization of location and decentralization of decision. Arita and McCann 
(2002) analyze the electronics and semiconductor industry and try to link the 
internal structure of the American and Japanese firms with the location of their 
assembly plants. According to the authors (p. 360), “the Japanese organizational 
arrangements are constructed within a strict hierarchical system with very little 
individual autonomy, whereas US firms have a greater degree of decision-making 
latitude.” Therefore, it may be seen that there is more delegation in the American 
structure than in the Japanese corporations. Assuming this, the model proposed 
here would expect there would be a tendency for the Japanese plants to be located 
closer to headquarters, whereas American plants would be more aggressive in pla-
cing their plants where the locational advantage appears to be higher. In the authors’ 
word: “(…) the US firms are much more spatially differentiated and internationally 
integrated than the Japanese firms, in the sense that the activities are distributed 
more widely according to both location and activity types” (p. 359). 
It has been claimed and shown that decreasing communication costs have played 
an important role for the process of production fragmentation. More than that, 
the economy of the metropolitan area becomes more specialized in services as 
communication costs diminish. The effects of communication costs cannot be un-
derstood (even analyzed) without incorporating into the framework the processes 
of learning, coordinating, and negotiating since the flow of information only affects 
the economy throughout interactions among agents. For this reason, the boundaries 
of the maximizing black-boxes have to be broken up and Aghion and Tirole (1997) 
offer an insightful model to do that. As result, the model shows that managerial 
structure plays also a relevant role for both processes: fragmentation of production 
and specialization of the metropolitan area’s economy. 
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The main limitation of this model is the assumption that migration costs are high 
enough to prevent firms from changing their location decision. Firms decide their 
best location and cannot move in response to the other firms’ choices. Besides, they 
do not know the preferences of those firms that are coming and, then, they make 
the decision taking into consideration only those firms that have already placed. An 
interesting extension of the work would be to derive the equilibrium by assuming 
there is a finite cost of migration. In this case, it is important to introduce some 
centrifugal forces - such as congestion costs – as well. 
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